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THE FAILED PROMISE OF REGULATORY
VARIABLES
HAROLD J. KRENT*
The dialogue among scholars of law and linguistics manifests the schism
between those (predominantly legal scholars) willing to embrace a dynamic
theory of statutory interpretation and those unwilling to bend the text quite
so far, at least without abandoning the pretense that some form of
(predominantly linguists) interpretation is at work. To bridge that gap,
several participants in the recent conference proposed the idea of a
regulatory variable to explain why the legal interpretation of certain words
or even phrases in a statute may change substantially over time. Thus, in
Professor Hart's famous hypothetical of the prohibition on "all vehicles in
the park," the term "vehicle" can be seen as a regulatory variable. Courts
therefore may justifiably construe "vehicle" variably depending upon the
circumstances. An ambulance entering the park at the request of an injured
patron is not a vehicle, despite the fact that ambulance falls comfortably
within the term's ordinary understanding but an ambulance joy riding
through the park would fall within the statutory prohibition. The idea of a
regulatory variable is alluring, for statutory language as a whole can bind
judges within a range of narrow interpretive alternatives-an apartment
building is not a "park" no matter that playground equipment is in its
courtyard--even if the meaning of certain words or phrases, such as
vehicle, must of necessity be altered with new conditions unforeseen by the
legislature.
But the concept of a regulatory variable is misleading. All statutory
language is susceptible to numerous interpretations that would be
impossible to predict in advance. And myriad changes in financial or social
situations may make legislative directives difficult to apply in future
generations. Banking restrictions make little sense in a world of ATM's,
and discovery rules need to be adapted to an era of e-mail. As several
conferees noted, it is not just the term vehicle that may become a
regulatory variable, but all terms in the statute. Is the airspace above the
parkground part of the park? Does "in" include a vehicle on the sidewalk
* Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. Princeton (1977); J.D. New York
University (1982).
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encircling the park? And, if statutes as a whole are immanent regulatory
variables,' the concept loses all substance.
Nonetheless, the idea of a regulatory variable is helpful in reframing the
debate over the propriety of dynamic or activist statutory interpretation.
Because interpretation inevitably includes some choice or vari-
ables-whether interpretation is based upon a textualist, intentionalist, or
legal process approach-it entails delegation of authority to the interpreter.
Choice exists even in ascertaining what linguists refer to as conventional
meaning: which sources are relevant in determining submeaning; what type
of empirical evidence is probative; and whose conventions are more
important, those of Congress, judges, or the citizenry as a whole?
A key question to address is therefore the allocation of interpretive
authority among institutions. Are judges free to choose the methodology for
determining the meaning of statutory language? Should judges engage in
dynamic interpretation if that role is explicitly or implicitly prescribed by
Congress? Even if there is no explicit or implicit delegation, can courts
nonetheless be activist in furthering other social or political values?
In administrative law, the question of the allocation of interpretive
authority has long been paramount. Under the Chevron doctrine,2 courts
(at least doctrinally) will defer to all reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory language. The underlying justification is that Congress,
even when not expressly saying so, intends to delegate such interstitial
interpretive authority to the agency charged with administering the statute.
Thus, in Chevron, the Court concluded that, if Congress uses ambiguous
terms such as "stationary source" in a pollution abatement statute, the
primary responsibility for construing that term should rest with the agency
(the EPA) administering the statute.3 The presumption of intentional
delegation serves as an easily administrable bright-line rule. Congress can
always overcome the presumption by expressing a contrary intent.
Although the Supreme Court never demonstrated an empirical basis for
the presumption, it provided an ideological justification. Justice Stevens
1. Professors Eskridge and Levi now term the concept regulatory variablility. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q.
1103 (1995). The idea of regulatory variability may perceptively describe what judges do, but it fails
either to explain how judges determine the meaning of language or to justify their departures from
conventional meanings to serve other goals.
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Such delegations are dynamic in authorizing those agencies to alter interpretations with
changing conditions and political winds. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpreta-
tions, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 20, 42-46 (1988).
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explained:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch
of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political
interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsi-
bilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government
to make such policy choices.
4
In Justice Stevens' view, interpretation becomes a political act, whether by
congressional staff, judges, or administrative agencies.
In contexts in which a congressional intent to delegate interpretive
authority to agencies is manifest, Chevron is not controversial. Congress
should be able to delegate interpretive authority to agencies just as it does
other policymaking tasks. Agencies exercise no more authority in
ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions than they do in fleshing
out which broadcast licenses are in the "public interest,"5 or which defense
bases have become obsolete.
6
Chevron remains problematic, however, when there is little reason to
believe that Congress would have intended the agency to exercise
interpretive authority. Indeed, courts themselves have ignored Chevron in
a substantial number of cases.7 Many factors influence whether judges
defer to agency's interpretation of statutes, such as whether the agency's
interpretation raises a constitutional issue,' whether the agency's interpreta-
tion is retroactive,9 whether it expands the agency's own jurisdiction, 0
4. 467 U.S. at 865. Under Chevron, courts first ascertain-without any deference to the
agency-whether the contested statutory language is clear. If the language is ambiguous, then the courts
will defer to any reasonable construction by the agency.
5. Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307-08 (1988).
6. See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. § 2687. The non-
delegation doctrine is no longer aggressively enforced. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993) (excoriating broad delegations of policymaking authority to
unaccountable agencies).
7. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trade Councils,
485 U.S. 568 (1988). In addition, courts perhaps have ignored Chevron when, for political reasons, they
cannot abide by the agency's interpretation.
9. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
10. But see Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
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or whether the agency has principal authority for administering the
statute." For instance, when the Department of Agriculture is interpreting
the language in a regulatory permit, Chevron deference makes little
sense." And Chevron may also make little sense when a prosecutor is
interpreting a statute he or she is enforcing. 3 In other words, when
Congress' intent to delegate is plain or at least reasonably inferred from the
statutory scheme, the deference rule is followed, but if there are reasons to
suspect that Congress would not have (or should not have) delegated such
interpretive authority to agencies, then courts are more reluctant to
rigorously apply the Chevron analysis. Courts, in other words, do not
permit agencies to treat all ambiguous phrases as regulatory variables.
The courts' ambivalence about Chevron illustrates the difficulty of
categorically allocating interpretive authority between courts and legisla-
tures in all statutory interpretation cases. The allocation of interpretive
responsibility within our legal system may hinge both on congressional
intent as well as on external values bearing on the propriety of judicial
activist interpretation. Characterizing particular statutory language as a
regulatory variable dodges the thorny issues. Who, after all, must decide
whether a regulatory variable exists? Rather, as in the administrative law
context, we should focus more explicitly on the reasons why particular
institutions should exert greater or lesser authority in interpreting statutory
language, whether because of one institution's comparatively greater
expertise, because of the passage of time, or because of background norms
in our society.
Some judicial discretion is inevitable. At least in the absence of
congressional direction, courts must determine the methodology for
interpreting statutory language. Courts must then employ that methodology
to understand statutory language and then apply that language to the
controversies that arise.
Congress can limit judicial discretion-at least to a large extent4--by
11. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
12. See Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp. v. Hathaway, 936 F.2d 601 (Ist Cir. 1991).
13. The Supreme Court implicitly rejected the applicability of Chevron to interpretation of criminal
statutes in recent cases such as United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994), and
Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994). See also Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177-
83 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting inapplicability of Chevron).
14. Congress cannot, however, through use of presumptions or canons, direct an impermissible
result. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (invalidating statute, which by
mandating presumption of disloyalty for all those receiving presidential pardons, infringed on
President's pardon power).
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instructing courts how to interpret its commands. Congress can indicate
which presumptions to use in interpreting statutory language and presum-
ably even what type of interpretive theory to apply. Congress has in fact
passed a Dictionary Act"5 to provide a "few general rules for the construc-
tion of statutes,"' 6 and courts have relied on the Act to resolve interpretive
issues. 7 Despite the congressional direction, however, some discretion
remains, for Congress cannot anticipate all the interpretive quandaries that
will arise.
Even when the statutory language is relatively clear, however, judges
may at times trump a conventional understanding in pursuit of some
external political or social goal. Such activism is most defensible when
Congress implicitly delegates that authority to courts. As with delegations
to administrative agencies, Congress often uses indeterminate language,
inviting courts to apply a statute's wording in a flexible, common-law like
manner. Courts could not do otherwise with statutory language forbidding
,'restraints of trade" in the Sherman Antitrust Act,'" "discrimination" under
Title VII,' 9 protecting "personal privacy" under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act,2" or requiring "reasonable accommodations" under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.2 Congress in such statutes may be
viewed as delegating authority to the courts to develop legislative principles
through the common law.' Indeed, courts on occasion have asked
whether excessive delegation is consistent with Congress' lawmaking
function.23
Even when the delegation is not explicit, or the statutory language so
open-ended, Congress might be thought to have implicitly delegated
considerable interpretive authority to the courts for a variety of reasons.
Because of inevitable errors in drafting and unforeseen applications,
Congress might delegate a broad interpretive role to courts simply as a
matter of efficiency. Congress is willing to abide by the occasional judicial
15. 1 U.S.C. § 1, et seq (1988).
16. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1474 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Poland). In the Act,
Congress has defined such commonly used terms as "person" and warned that statutes applying to
singular entities should apply to plural entities as well.
17. See, e.g., Rowland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 113 S. CL 716 (1993); Ngiraingas v.
Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1988).
22. Harold J. Krent, Delegation and its Discontents, 94 Cor.uM. L. REv. 710, 728-30 (1994).
23. Id. at 741 n.32.
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error, knowing that it can always correct a distasteful interpretation after the
fact. For instance, the Supreme Court in recent terms has arguably altered
statutory language in concluding that the term "knowingly" in a criminal
prohibition modifies not only the verb following it, but also all subsequent
verbs in the same clause.24 The Court's interpretation may violate the
linguistically preferred reading of the statute,25 yet Congress can always
amend the statute and otherwise is spared the necessity of revisiting the
issue. In such cases, courts act on behalf of Congress, attempting to answer
questions roughly as would have the enacting legislature.26
But courts may also interpret statutes more creatively, even when such
activism does not respond to delegated authority from Congress. As with
departures from the Chevron doctrine, courts may embark upon more
activist interpretation when there is less reason to defer to a coordinate
branch of government. Majoritarian rule is not the exclusive norm in our
constitutional system. For instance, when Congress' legislation trenches
upon constitutional values, it may be reasonable to allocate more dynamic
interpretive responsibility to the courts in keeping with their traditional role
in defining and preserving constitutional interests." Similarly, courts may
justifiably exercise greater interpretive discretion if a legislative process
defect exists.28 Just as judicial review itself comports with the checks and
balances within our system, so may dynamic interpretation.
The regulatory variable concept attempts to do the impossible by
preserving interpretive flexibility within a legis-centric theory of statutory
construction. Resolution of the tension between legislative primacy and
creative interpretation by judges should turn instead on contextual
judgments concerning the allocation of interpretive responsibility within our
system of separated powers. No problem arises if Congress intends to
24. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 467-69.
25. Cf Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning andHard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1570-77
(1994).
26. The Court has performed an analogous function under the dormant commerce clause,
responding on Congress' behalf to perceived state incursions into interstate commerce.
27. Judicial activism is particularly apt if the constitutional norm is underenforced, as with the
nondelegation doctrine or the Tenth Amendment. See generally CASS R. SuNSTEIN, AFrER THE RiGHTs
REVOLUTION 160-192 (1990); John C. Nagle, Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. REV. (forthcoming).
In contrast, some canons of statutory interpretation, unlike the canon of avoiding constitutional
questions when an alternative reading is fairly possible, merely attempt to further legislative will. For
example, consider the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
28. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding that Congress had not conferred
upon Civil Service Commission the power to exclude resident aliens from working for the government).
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delegate such subsidiary lawmaking powers to the courts, and many would
agree that courts should similarly be activist in safeguarding constitutional
and possibly other interests. Because interpretation inevitably is a political
act, we should focus not on ways to conceal the shared power between
legislatures and courts, but on ways to rationalize and delimit the courts'
exercise of subsidiary lawmaking authority through interpretation.
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